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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE NO. 1;

Did the lower court err in concluding as a

matter of law that Defendant was given a warning of the
consequences of submitting to a blood draw sufficient under
statutory and constitutional standards.
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are
reviewed for correctness.
(Utah 1993) .

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271

See also. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah

1994) (" [C]orrectness means the appellate court decides the
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial
judge's determination of law.")
ISSUE NO. 2:

Whether the lower court erred in finding as a

matter of fact that Defendant consented to the blood draw.
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard.
n. 2 (Utah 1988).

State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787

See also. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36

(Utah 1994) (A trial court's finding is clearly erroneous when it
is against the clear weight of the evidence or, although there is
evidence to support it, the court reviewing the record evidence
is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.); State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991)
deferentially review the trial court's determination that
2

("we

defendant consented to the blood test, as is appropriate with all
factual determinations.").
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Utah Code § 41-6-44.5(1)(b):
In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section
41-6-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical
test inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or
breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible
except when prohibited by the Rules of Evidence or the
constitution.
Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(1)(a):
A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test
or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose
of determining whether he was operating or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited
under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or while under the
influence of alcohol, any drug or combination of
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, if the test
is or tests are administered at the direction of a
peace officer having grounds to believe that person to
have been operating or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44
3

Utah Code § 41-6-44.10 (2) (a) and (b) :
(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has
then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any
one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1),
and refuses to submit to the chemical test or any one
or all of the tests requested, the person shall be
warned by a peace officer requesting the test or tests
that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can
result in revocation of his license to operate a motor
vehicle.
(b) Following this warning under Subsection (a), if
the person does not immediately request that the
chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be
administered a peace officer shall serve on the person,
on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate
notice of the Driver License Division's intention to
revoke ....
Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(3):
Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other
condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit
to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have
withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1),
and the test or tests may be administered whether the
person has been arrested or not.
Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(7):
For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a
chemical test or tests, the person to be tested does
not have the right to consult an attorney or have an
attorney, physician, or other person present as a
condition for the taking of any test.
Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(8):
If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a
chemical test or tests or any additional test under
this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out
of acts alleged to have been committed while the person
was operating or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol ....

4

Utah Code § 53-3-223(1) (a) :
If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe
that a person may be violating or has violated Section
41-6-44, ... the peace officer may, in connection with
arresting the person, request that the person submit to
a chemical test or tests to be administered in
compliance with the standards under Section 41-6-44.10.
Utah Code § 53-3-223(2):
The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the
person's submission to a chemical test that a test
result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 or 416-44.6 shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol
content sufficient to render the person incapable of
safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in
suspension or revocation of the person's license to
drive a motor vehicle.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a criminal prosecution for driving under the
influence of alcohol ("DUI").

Defendant's vehicle rounded a

corner, crossed the center line and collided with an oncoming
vehicle.

Officer Newren found Defendant reclined in the driver's

seat, with both Defendant and his vehicle smelling strongly of
alcohol.

Defendant was transported to a hospital, where he was

treated for relatively minor injuries.
impaired.

Defendant is hearing

Officer Newren went to the hospital and, based on his

observations, arrested Defendant for DUI.

Officer Newren,

without reference to a printed form, explained from memory Utah's
Implied Consent law to Defendant.

Officer Newren requested

Defendant to submit to a blood draw.

Officer Newren considered

Defendant's conduct to be consent to the blood draw.
submitted to a blood draw.

Defendant

The result was a blood/alcohol
5

content ("BAC") level of .15%.

The City of Orem ("the City")

brought criminal charges.
Proceedings in Trial Court
In a suppression hearing held on April 14, 1994, Defendant
moved to suppress the BAC result on two grounds: (1) Officer
Newren did not comply with the requirements of the implied
consent law; (2) Defendant, because of his hearing impairment,
could not and did not consent to the blood draw.

The trial court

denied the motion to suppress.

Trial proceeded by proffer and

stipulation on April 25, 1994.

The trial court convicted based

on a stipulated .15% BAC.

(Trial Transcript, p. 4-8).

Defendant

appealed the denial of the motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts
On January 25, 1994 at approximately 7:12 p.m. Officer Scott
Newren of the Orem Department of Public Safety was dispatched to
an automobile accident in the area of 487 South Carterville1
Road in Orem, Utah.

Suppression Transcript, p. 3.

When Officer

Newren arrived at the accident scene he observed the results of a
head-on collision, caused after Defendant's southbound Toyota
Celica rounded a corner, crossed the center line, and collided
with an oncoming northbound Buick. Id. at 4.

As he approached

the Celica, Officer Newren observed Defendant reclined in the
driver's seat. Id. at 5.

Defendant had blood on his face,

apparently caused by one or more facial wounds. Id.

Officer

Newren smelled "a strong odor of alcoholic beverage in the
1

The transcript incorrectly indicates "Cardinal" Road.
6

vehicle." Id.

Defendant was extracted from his vehicle and

transported to Orem Community Hospital for medical attention.
Id. at 5, 6.

Following police procedure in injury accident

cases, Officer Newren went to the hospital, where he again
smelled a strong odor of alcoholic beverage about Defendant.
at 6.

Id.

Defendant indicated to Officer Newren, and previously to

the hospital staff, that he was hearing impaired.

Id. at 9.

At

some point prior to arrest, Defendant told Officer Newren that he
had consumed a mixed drink earlier in the evening.

Id. at 6.

Officer Newren performed only the horizontal gaze nystagmus test,
requiring no voluntary movement by the person tested. Id. at 8.
Officer Newren informed defendant that he was under arrest for
driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 6.

Because of

defendant's injuries, Officer Newren did not ask him to perform
field sobriety tests; instead, Officer Newren "felt it was more
important just to have a blood draw."

Id. at 7-8.

Though

Officer Newren was aware of Defendant's hearing impairment, he
felt Defendant could understand him by reading lips. Id. at 9.
Consequently, prior to requesting blood from Defendant, Officer
Newren conveyed to him Utah's Implied Consent Law as follows:
"Basically the same as they're written in the admonitions of
[sic] the back of the [DUI] report form, that he does have the
right to refuse, if he does this, his license can be revoked for
one year without a provision for a limited license.

That a

result indicating .08 or greater could result in the denial of
his license for three months."

Id. at 9.
7

Officer Newren asked

Defendant if he could perform a blood draw to which Defendant
replied affirmatively by nodding his head and saying "Okay,"
at 14-16.

Defendant was alert at this time.

Id.

Id. at 12.

Defendant's hearing condition unquestionably made communication
more problematic than it would have been if Defendant was not
hearing impaired.

Id. at 13.

Officer Newren testified that he

showed Defendant both a blood draw consent form and a signature
form (see Exhibit #1, Addenda), explained both forms to
Defendant, and watched Defendant sign the signature form.
10.

Id. at

Soon after, Officer Newren watched while a registered nurse

drew blood from Defendant.

Id.

The blood draw occurred at

21:00 hours or nine o'clock p.m., about one (1) hour and fortyfive (45) minutes after the accident.

See Exhibit #1, Addenda,

and compare with the 7:12 p.m. time of the accident dispatch.
There is no indication or claim that the blood draw occurred in
any untoward manner.

During the blood draw, Defendant neither

wriggled nor resisted the test, nor did he seem surprised it was
occurring.

Suppression Transcript, p. 10.

showed a .15% BAC.

The test result

Trial Transcript, p. 4; see also. Exhibit #2,

Addenda.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The City's argument proceeds as follows:

Since Defendant

was under arrest for DUI, the City has no affirmative duty to
show he consented to the blood draw, because consent is implied
by law.

Defendant's hearing impairment does not affect his

implied consent.

Even if the City must show consent to the draw,
8

the record shows Defendant consented.
Officer Newren complied with his obligations to convey to
Defendant his rights under the implied consent law.

Even if

Officer Newren did not properly convey the implied consent law to
Defendant, Officer Newren's supposed non-compliance did not
preclude proper admission of Defendant's BAC results in a
criminal prosecution.

Non-compliance can only preclude

admission of BAC tests in a criminal prosecution where either the
Rules of Evidence prevent admission of the test, or Defendant's
constitutional rights are violated in acquiring his blood sample.
Neither the Rules of Evidence nor the constitution prevented
proper admission of Defendant's BAC test result.
Even if Defendant did not consent to the blood draw, the
test result was properly admissible because of the overall
reasonableness of Officer Newren's actions.
ARGUMENT
WHERE A DUI SUSPECT IS ARRESTED THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO SHOW CONSENT.
Defendant claims there was no consent to the blood draw.
Under Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(2)(a), where a DUI suspect is under
arrest, the government has no affirmative duty to show consent to
submit to a BAC test, because such consent is implied by law.
Since consent is implied when a driver uses the road, the only
showing the government must make regarding an arrested defendant
is that he/she was asked to take the test.
this question.

Case law is clear on

See, e.g., Clontz v. Jensen, 416 N.W.2d 577

(Neb. 1987)("The only understanding required by the licensee is
9

that he has been asked to take a test.

It is not a defense that

he does not understand the consequences of a refusal

....");

State v. Webb, 443 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. App. 1994) ("In all cases the
court is required to find only that the implied consent law was
conveyed to the suspect driver.

The State is under no duty to

prove the suspect driver fully understood his rights under the
implied consent law.

In this respect a hearing impaired driver

does not have greater rights and privileges than a hearing
driver.")(emphasis in original); People v. Thorson, 496 N.E.2d
304 (111. App. 1986)("consent is implied, so that there need not
be an affirmative showing of consent.");

People v. Rosario, 518

N.Y.S.2d 906 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1987)("Contrary to defendant's
contention, the People have no obligation to establish, as a
condition precedent to admission of a breathalyzer test results
at trial, that defendant affirmatively consented to take the
test.

Rather, ... such consent is deemed to have been given when

defendant used the highway . . . . " ) ; State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12
(Utah App. 1988)("R.L.I, stands only for the proposition that if
an arrest has not taken place, the subject is entitled to know
the purpose for which the blood is drawn and the subject may
withdraw the statutory implied consent.")(emphasis added)(citing
Interest of R.L.I., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987) (rev'd on
other grounds).
Under these authorities, when Defendant used the road he
impliedly consented to submit to the blood draw, and that consent
remained in force at all times, since he did not expressly
10

withdraw his consent.

According to Defendant's testimony, he

knew he was asked to take a test, and he consented to it, both
impliedly and in fact, though he claims he thought the test was
for a purpose other than BAC testing.

Suppression Transcript, p.

41, 43; see also, Exhibit #1, Addenda.'
DEFENDANT'S HEARING IMPAIRMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
WITHDRAWAL OF HIS IMPLIED CONSENT.
Defendant argues that even if Officer Newren adequately
conveyed the implied consent law admonitions to him, Defendant's
status as a hearing impaired person and his involvement in the
accident prevented his being able to consent to the blood draw.
However, since Defendant was under arrest, his consent is
implied, and the government therefore is not required to show
express consent.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(3) reads:

Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other
condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit
to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have
withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1),
and the test or tests may be administered whether the
person has been arrested or not.
Id. (emphasis added).
Even if Defendant's status as a hearing impaired person or
his alleged status of being confused after the accident prevented
him from understanding the implied consent admonitions, his BAC
test is still admissible under Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(3), quoted
above.

Being confused or hearing impaired constitutes "any other

condition rendering him incapable of refusal."

Under a plain

reading of the above-quoted language, Defendant is "considered to
not have withdrawn his consent."
11

Id. (emphasis added).

Such a reading of the statute is consistent with case law
from other jurisdictions.

In State v. Webb, 443 S.E.2d 630 (Ga.

App. 1994) a hearing impaired driver was arrested DUI.

The

driver claimed the State should have had in place a system
whereby it could provide access to an interpreter, which, unlike
the statutory scheme in Utah, is qualifiedly required under
Georgia's implied consent law.

The court stated that inability

to understand the officer did not constitute a withdrawal of the
defendant's consent:
[T]he defendant's inability to understand the officer
did not constitute a "withdrawal" of his implied
consent. That the officer conveys to the driver his
right to an additional test is the most the law now
requires before depriving the state of its right to
introduce the test evidence at trial. ... We need not
decide such issues because the State proved that the
arresting officer conveyed Webb's implied rights to him
within the meaning of the implied consent law, to which
all drivers are subject. The state is under no duty to
show appellee's affirmative waiver of an additional
chemical test.
Id. at 632 (emphasis in original).
The analysis in Webb was based on an earlier decision
involving language barriers. In State v. Tosar, 350 S.E.2d 811
(Ga. App. 1986), the Spanish speaking DUI defendant claimed that
since he did not understand one of the aspects of the implied
consent law conveyed by the English speaking officer, he could
not knowingly waive one of his rights.

After finding the

defendant could not understand the officer and therefore was not
informed of his rights under the implied consent law, the trial
court suppressed the evidence.

On appeal, the state argued that

because of the Spanish speaking defendant's inability to
12

understand the English speaking officer, the defendant fell into
the category of "otherwise incapable of refusal" under Georgia's
statute.

Id. at 812.

The appellate court agreed with the state:

This contention has merit where the statute is read to
mean that the inability to understand the rights read
in English rendered the non-English speaking appellee's
condition "the same as unconscious, i.e., in a
noncommunicative condition."
[citation omitted] ...
[A]ppellee's inability to understand him rendered him
non-communicative.
Id.
Tosar was ultimately decided on different grounds.

Tosar

and Webb both had to do with a defendant not understanding a
particular component of Georgia's implied consent law.

Both

cases, however, support the proposition that inability to
communicate, whether because of hearing impairment or because of
a language barrier, constitutes a condition inclusive under the
"any other condition rendering him incapable of refusal" language
of Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(3). If Defendant's condition rendered
him noncommunicative, his consent to submit to the BAC test was
implied, and his non-communicative status does not serve as a
withdrawal of his consent.
EVEN IF CONSENT IS REQUIRED, THE RECORD SHOWS DEFENDANT
CONSENTED TO THE BLOOD DRAW.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in finding consent.
While the City argues voluntary consent is not necessary for the
BAC test to be admissible, even if consent is required, the
record shows Defendant gave voluntary consent to the blood draw.
When consent is challenged, the government bears the burden
of showing consent by meeting the following burden of proof:
13

(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that
the consent was "unequivocable and specific" and
"freely and intelligently given";
(2) the government must prove consent was given
without duress or coercion, express or implied;
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable presumption
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
and there must be convincing evidence that such rights
were waived.
State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991) .
This three-prong.standard is cumulative.

The government

must show each prong by a preponderance of the evidence.
v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1994)

State

("we believe Brown's

approval of the preponderance of the evidence standard controls
and that standard is appropriate for all cases dealing with
voluntariness of consent.").
Officer Newren's testimony was that after he told Defendant
why a test was being requested and after explaining Defendant's
right to refuse, Defendant nodded his head in the affirmative and
said "Okay."

Defendant did not wriggle, seem surprised, or

resist during the blood draw.

Suppression Transcript, p. 10, 16.

Also, based on his own communications with Defendant and
that of the personnel treating Defendant before Officer Newren's
arrival at the hospital, Officer Newren "felt that Mr. Solomon
was able to understand me if I were to look at him directly so he
could read my lips.

I feel that he's a very good lip reader."

Id. at 9, 14.
Moreover, Defendant signed a blood draw consent form.
at 41, 43; see also. Exhibit #1, Addenda.

14

It is very clear

Id.

Defendant knew he was being asked to submit to a blood draw,
although he claims he did not know what the draw was for.
Suppression Transcript, 41, 43.
Additional communications occurred.

Defendant told Officer

Newren about consuming a mixed drink prior to the accident. Id.
at 6.

Defendant indicated to Officer Newren that he was hearing

impaired. Id. at 9.
As to express or implied coercion or duress, notwithstanding
Defendant's claim that he was in a dynamic environment, with
people poking things in his face (id. at 41) , the record shows
one officer telling Defendant why he wanted a blood draw, with
one nurse in the background preparing a blood draw kit.
16.

Id. at

Again, Defendant did not resist or seem surprised the draw

was taking place.

Id. at 10.

Even indulging every presumption against waiver of
fundamental rights in favor of Defendant, under a preponderance
of the evidence standard, these facts show the trial court was
correct in finding as a matter of fact that there was consent,
and its ruling should be upheld under the clearly erroneous
standard.
OFFICER NEWREN MET HIS DUTIES UNDER THE
IMPLIED CONSENT LAW.
Defendant claims Officer Newren did not give him a
sufficient warning of the consequences of submitting to the blood
draw.

In Utah, the only warning the officer must give an

arrested defendant is that refusal can result in revocation.
Utah Code § 41-6-44.10 (2) (a) reads:
15

(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has
then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any
one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1),
and refuses to submit to the chemical test or any one
or all of the tests requested, the person shall be
warned by a peace officer requesting the test or tests
that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can
result in revocation of his license to operate a motor
vehicle.
(b) Following this warning under Subsection (a), if
the person does not immediately request that the
chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be
administered a peace officer shall serve on the person,
on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate
notice of the Driver License Division's intention to
revoke ....
See Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(2)(a) and (b).
If the person has been (1) placed under arrest, and (2) has
then been requested to submit to a BAC test, and (3) refuses to
submit to a BAC test, then, after refusal, and only then, is the
officer required to give the refusal admonition, that refusal
results in revocation of license to drive.
Defendant's argument that he was not informed of his rights
under the implied consent law is without merit.

The record shows

Officer Newren met his duties under Utah Code § 41-6-44.10.
Since Defendant was under arrest2 at the time Officer Newren
requested the blood test, the above quoted Utah Code § 41-644.10(2) (a) and (b) are applicable.
This statute requires that an officer inform a refusing
defendant that his/her license may be revoked he/she refuses a

2

The court found both probable cause to arrest and actual
arrest. Suppression Transcript, p. 37, 48. Defendant apparently
does not contest this on appeal.
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request to submit to a BAC test.

Asked what general principles

he conveyed to Defendant, Officer Newren testified about the
warning he gave:
Basically the same as they're written in the
admonitions of [sic] the back of the [DUI] report form,
that he does have the right to refuse, if he does this,
his license can be revoked for one year without
provision for a limited license. That a result
indicating .08 or greater could result in denial of his
license for three months.
Suppression Transcript, p. 9.
I indicated that I was drawing the blood for an alcohol
test, that he could refuse if he so desired, but that
refusal would indicate that--or indicate that he could
lose his license for one year without any provision for
a limited license, and that .08 or greater would result
in probable suspension of his license for 90 days.
Id. at 14.
It is true that Officer Newren explained more than required
before requesting the test.

That is, he gave the refusal

admonition and he requested the test in one breath so to speak,
rather than requesting the test, waiting for a refusal, and then
giving the refusal admonition as contemplated by Utah Code § 416-44.10(2) (b) .

Since Defendant consented, Officer Newren did not

have to give him any refusal warnings, but the warnings were
given anyway.
Defendant in the trial court argued that since Officer
Newren gave the refusal admonition before a refusal, a blood draw
could only be taken if the defendant immediately requested the
test, as contemplated by Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(2) (b) .
Suppression Transcript, p. 28.

Defendant in fact immediately

requested the test when he nodded his head and said "Okay."
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Id.

at 10.
Officer Newren's admonition prior to a refusal, "surplusage"
in the trial court's words, and his correctly informing Defendant
about the potential of a ninety (90) day suspension for a BAC
level .08% or greater (not a required warning tor a criminal
case, but required for a civil case under Title 53), can hardly
be considered prejudicial to Defendant.

Id. at 30.

There is no

policy reason to interpret the implied consent law in the
mechanical manner Defendant urges.
Case law indicates a common-sense, reasonable communication
of the implied consent admonitions is acceptable.

In Olson v.

State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1985), the defendant claimed the
officer's statement that his license "will" be suspended rather
than "may" be suspended for refusing to submit to a test was
misleading, thus negating knowing and voluntary consent.

The

court held a reasonable apprisal of the defendant's rights under
the statute is sufficient for the purposes of the implied consent
law:
We hold now that if the arrested person is
reasonably informed of his rights, duties and
obligations under our implied consent law and he
is neither tricked or misled into thinking he has
no right to refuse[,] ... the test will generally
be held admissible.
A fair reading of the entire implied consent law
indicates that a person arrested for DWUI should
be warned that his driving privileges will be in
jeopardy unless he submits to a chemical test. We
do not think precise words are determinative
unless the language used by the arresting officer
was misleading or not entirely clear.
Id. at 113 (citations omitted); see also, Cowan v. Schwendiman,
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769 P.2d 280 (Utah App. 1989)(Implied consent law is to be
construed in a reasonable, practicable manner under the
circumstances the officer faces.); Town of Mount Pleasant v.
Shaw, 432 S.E.2d 450 (S.C. 1993)("We agree with those
jurisdictions which hold that an advisory is sufficient if,
construed as a whole, it provides the driver adequate notice that
he may, if he so elects, refuse the test.11).
In the instant matter, Defendant was at the very least
reasonably informed of his rights under the implied consent law.
He was told he could refuse, and he was told of the consequences
thereof.

Suppression Transcript, p. 9, 14.

Officer Newren

reasonably and substantially conveyed the substance of the
implied consent law to Defendant.

Therefore, the trial court was

correct in rejecting Defendant's argument that the BAC result
should have been suppressed on the grounds that Officer Newren
insufficiently conveyed Defendant's rights to him.
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 41-6-44.10 DOES NOT RENDER
CHEMICAL TEST RESULTS INADMISSIBLE IN A CRIMINAL
PROCEEDING.
Defendant asserts Officer Newren failed to comply with Utah
Code § 41-6-44.10, and therefore the blood test results should
have been suppressed.

Even if Officer Newren did not properly

convey the implied consent law to Defendant, his BAC test was
still properly admitted because non-compliance with Utah Code §
section 41-6-44.10 does not preclude admissibility of a BAC test
in a criminal prosecution for DUI, though it may be fatal to a
civil driver license hearing.
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At the suppression hearing, the issue was raised whether the
implied consent admonitions of Utah Code 41-6-44.10 must be given
as a condition precedent to obtaining an admissible blood test.
Suppression Transcript, p. 18-20, 25-26.

The court ruled as a

matter of law that communicating the implied consent admonitions
of Utah Code § 41-6-44.10 is not a condition precedent to
obtaining an admissible blood alcohol test:
THE COURT: ... Moreover, I find that the provisions of
the statute have only one purpose in effect, which is
to warn a refusing, an arrested refusing person that
they will be suspended because of the refusal, to give
them a chance to cure that before they automatically
lose their license because of the refusal. To the
extent your motion is predicated on ... the provisions
of . . . 4 [1]-6-44.10 and on Cruz, I deny the motion.
Suppression Transcript, p. 27.
The trial court's ruling on this point is correct as a
matter of law.

Utah law, codified at Utah Code § 41-6-

44.5(1) (b), states as much:
In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section
41-6-44.10 does not render results of a chemical test
inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or
breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible
except when prohibited by the Rules of Evidence or the
constitution.
See Utah Code § 41-6-44.5(b)(emphasis added). 3
While the City has not located a Utah case construing Utah

3

This section was enacted in the 1993 legislative session
and was in force on the day Defendant was arrested DUI. See S.B.
No. 85 (passed 3/01/93, approved 3/16/93, effective 5/03/93); 1993
Laws of Utah, Chapter 161; contained in, 2 Utah Legislative Report
1050 (1993) .
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Code § 41-6-44.5(b), 4 there is existing case law supporting the
proposition that non-compliance with a state's implied consent
law does not preclude admission of test results in a criminal
proceeding, even though the non-compliance precludes admission in
a civil driver license hearing.
State v. Pittman, 985 N.W.2d 736 (Minn App. 1986), is a one
car accident DUI case where the issue on appeal was whether the
officer's non-compliance with Minnesota's implied consent law
should have resulted in suppression of the blood test.

The

officer's admitted non-compliance was failing to offer a choice
between two of three available tests (blood, breath, urine) as
required by Minnesota's implied consent statute.
After noting a then-recent change in Minnesota implied
consent law, see supra note 5, the court stated that while noncompliance with the implied consent law is fatal to admissibility
in the civil driver license revocation hearing, test results
acquired in violation of the implied consent law are still
admissible in a criminal DWI prosecution:
Compliance with the procedures of the implied consent
law is a prerequisite to a driver's license revocation
under the implied consent statute. [citation omitted]
However, not all procedures of the implied consent
statute apply to DWI prosecutions.
Thus, while the results of the chemical analysis of
4

Statutes similar to Utah Code § 41-6-44.(1)(b) seem to be
a fairly new development. See, e.g., State v. Pittman, 985 N.W.2d
736 (Minn. App. 1986)("This
[DWI] statute formerly allowed
admission of test results in a DWI prosecution only when the test
was taken voluntarily or pursuant to the implied consent law.
[citation omitted] In 1984 the [Minnesota] legislature deleted the
language in section 169.121 which contained this requirement.")
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Tyler's blood could be used in a prosecution of Tyler
for DWI, having been legally obtained, the results
could not properly serve as the basis of a revocation
of his license pursuant to the implied consent law.
Because Pittman was convicted under the DWI law, and
his blood test was otherwise legally obtained,
compliance with [the implied consent statute] was
unnecessary.
State v. Pittman, 395 N.W.2d at 738.
State v. Halverson, 413 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. App. 1987), is a
case where the driver was arrested DUI after an accident.

The

arresting officer read Minnesota's implied consent advisory to
the driver, which the driver understood.

The officer then

offered the driver a urine test, not a choice of a blood or urine
test, as required by Minnesota's implied consent law.

The

defendant eventually gave two tests, showing a BAC of .17%.

In

the DWI criminal prosecution, the trial court suppressed the test
results based on the state's failure to offer a choice of a blood
or a urine test.

The state appealed.

The issue on appeal was, "Did the failure to offer a choice
between [tests] render the test results inadmissible in a
criminal prosecution?"

State v. Halverson, 413 N.W.2d at 860.

The court held that an officer's failure to comply with
Minnesota's implied consent statute does not render test results
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution:
If the advisory was inadequate as a matter of criminal
law, it would be suppressed. ... To the extent that
the test result was suppressed with regard to
respondent's civil implied consent license revocation,
the court was correct. ... To the extent the trial
court suppressed the test result with regard to the
criminal charges against respondent, however, the trial
court erred. In a criminal proceeding, compliance with
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the procedures of the implied consent law is not a
prerequisite. ... If the urine test was otherwise
legally obtained, it is admissible.
Id. at 861 (emphasis in original).
State v. Scott, 473 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. App. 1991) is a case
where the implied consent warnings were properly given, the
driver refused to submit to a test, and a test was performed
anyway.

The results were suppressed, and the appellate court

affirmed, on grounds not applicable in the instant matter: the
officer compelled the test after a refusal.
The City cites Scott, 473 N.W.2d 375, for its instruction
about the applicability of implied consent laws to criminal
proceedings.

Under implied consent laws, "the onerous civil

consequence of license revocation is designed to induce the
driver to submit to testing."

Scott, 473 N.W.2d at 377.

The

court further stated:
The minimum one-year revocation for refusal under the
implied consent statute is hardly a safe harbor, free
of adverse consequences. [citation omitted] When
compared with the 90-day minimum revocation for taking
but failing the test, the civil consequences strongly
compel the driver to take the test.
Id.
Implied consent laws, with their onerous consequences for
refusal, also provide a way for the government to peaceably
secure a test:
Although Schmerber [v. California, 86 S.Ct. 1826
(1966)] allows the state to compel an individual
arrested for driving while intoxicated to submit to a
blood alcohol test, the legislature has enacted the
implied consent law to []avoid the violent
confrontations which could occur when people are forced
to submit to testing.[] [citations omitted]
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State v. Scott, 473 N.W.2d at 377.
In Interest of I.R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987) (rev'd
on other grounds), this court stated the same principle as
follows:
By implying consent, the statute removes the right of a
driver to lawfully refuse, but cannot remove his
physical power to refuse.
The purpose of a warning of license suspension
following a refusal is to overcome an unsanctioned
refusal by threat instead of force. It is ... to nonforcibly enforce the driver's previous implied consent.
Thus, the purpose of such a law is to avoid the
violence which often attends attempts to forcibly test
recalcitrant drivers. Through the threat of potential
license suspension and the specter of use of a refusal
to submit to a blood test as evidence in any civil or
criminal action, police may persuade otherwise
unwilling drivers to submit to the test. Nothing
suggests a legislative intent to create a consent
search, but only to create a means of non-phvsical
persuasion.
Id., citing State v. Newton, 636 P.2d 393, 398 (Oregon
1981)(emphasis added).
The Scott court also discussed the principle that noncompliance with implied consent laws does not preclude test
admissibility in a criminal proceedings:
When the implied consent advisory is not given, the
results of a blood test may be used in the prosecution
of a DWI. [citation omitted] However, the results may
not be used as the basis for license revocation
pursuant to the implied consent law.
Id.
The cases discussed above stand for the proposition that
where a state has a statute similar to Utah Code § 41-645.5(1) (b) , non-compliance with that state's implied consent law
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does not render BAC test results inadmissible, so long as the
test results were not otherwise illegally obtained or admitted.5
Even if this court finds the cases discussed above
inapposite to the instant appeal, the City in this point of
argument urges the court to uphold the trial court's admission of
Defendant's blood test based on a plain reading analysis of Utah
Code § 41-6-45.5(1) (b), so long as the Rules of Evidence or the
constitution do not prohibit admission of the test.
Assuming Utah Code § 41-6-45.5(1) (b) means what is says, the
questions become (1) whether the Rules of Evidence precluded
admission of Defendant's blood test results, and (2) whether
there was a constitutional violation in acquiring Defendant's
blood sample.
THE RULES OF EVIDENCE DID NOT PRECLUDE ADMISSION OF
DEFENDANT'S BLOOD TEST.
When Defendant stipulated that his BAC was .15%, he waived
any evidentiary arguments contemplated by Utah Code § 41-644.5(1)(b).

See Suppression Transcript, p. 2-3.

No evidentiary

questions were presented in the trial court.

5

The City here assumes that phrases like "otherwise legally
admissible" used in Halverson, 413 N.W.2d at 861, and "otherwise
legally obtained" used in Pittman, 395 N.W.2d at 738, allude to
evidentiary and constitutional requirements similar to those
contemplated in Utah Code § 41-6-44.5(1) (b) .
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DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS NOT VIOLATED.
In Schmerber v. California, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966), the United
States Supreme Court "found blood testing procedures to plainly
constitute searches of persons" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, stating:
Such testing procedures plainly constitute searches of
"persons" and depend antecedently upon seizures of
"persons" within the meaning of that Amendment. ...
[T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to
constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but
against intrusions which are not justified in the
circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.
In other words, the questions we must decide in this
case are whether the police were justified in
requesting petitioner to submit to the blood test, and
whether the means an and procedures employed in taking
his blood respected relevant standards of Fourth
Amendment reasonableness.
Id. at 1834.
This court stated that where a defendant is arrested, the
suspect's consent may be implied, where the defendant is not
under arrest, the government must show actual consent.

Interest

of I.R.L., 739 P.2d 1127-28 (1987)(rev'd on other grounds).
After discussing Schmerber, this court summarized the
circumstances under which a warrantless search, i.e.,
administration of a blood test, can be justified under implied
consent:
(1)

There is probable cause to believe the suspect was
driving or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a statutorily prohibited
blood alcohol content,

(2)

The suspect was under arrest, and

(3)

The method of extraction of blood was reasonable.
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Interest of I.R.L., at 1128.6
(1)

There was probable cause to believe Defendant
drove while under the influence of alcohol or with
a statutorily prohibited BAC.

Officer Newren determined Defendant was driving.
Suppression Transcript, p. 4-5.

Defendant did not dispute this.

There was a strong odor of alcohol coming from Defendant's car
and from Defendant himself at the hospital.

Id. at p. 5-6.

Defendant's car crossed the center line, causing the collision.
Id. at 4.

Defendant stated he consumed a mixed drink before the

accident.

Id. at 6.

nystagmus

Officer Newren performed a horizontal gaze

("HGN") test "for my own confirmation. 11

Id. at 8.

The

court found probable cause based on these circumstances, except
the court gave no weight to the HGN test.

Id. at 48.

Cf., State

v. Curtis, 680 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Idaho App. 1984) (fact that
officer noted full and empty beer cans in defendant's car at
accident, smelled strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath in
ambulance, established reasonable cause for DUI, thus furnishing
probable cause to conduct a blood alcohol test).
(2)

Defendant was under arrest.

The record indicates, and the court found, that Defendant
was placed under arrest.

Suppression Transcript, p. 6, 3 7 .

In

DUI cases, where the officer has probable cause, the officer need
6

The City is not certain the I.R.L. court's characterizing
the constitutional analysis in terms of implied consent is correct.
Case law discussed infra indicates that consent is not required in
a criminal case and that violation of implied consent laws should
be a part of an admissibility analysis in a criminal case only
where the statutory violation also has constitutional dimensions.
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not witness the offence to make a warrantless arrest.

See Utah

Code § 41-6-44 (11) .
(3)

The method of blood extraction was reasonable.

The record shows the circumstances surrounding the draw were
reasonable.

The draw took place at the hospital.

registered nurse drew the blood.
standardized blood kit.

Id. at 10.

Id. at 16.

Id. at 5.

A

The nurse used a

Defendant already had

received separate medical attention, at least to the extent of
being cleaned up and not bleeding.

Id. at 17.

The blood was

drawn one (1) hour and fifty (50) minutes after the accident,
giving Defendant time to calm down.

See Exhibit #1, Addenda.

The defendant was not surprised by the test, nor did he resist or
show any sign of undue pain.

Suppression Transcript, p. 10.

Furthermore, as the City argued above, Defendant consented to the
blood draw.
Where a registered nurse, using standard methods in a
hospital setting, withdraws blood from a calm, consenting patient
who neither resists the test nor seems to show any undue
discomfort during the test, the clear conclusion is that the draw
was performed in a reasonable manner.

This court has previously

noted such a blood draw is constitutionally reasonable:
[S]uch a blood test was a reasonable type of test
because blood are draws commonplace, the quantity of
blood extracted was minimal, there was virtually no
risk, trauma, or pain involved, and it was performed by
a physician in a hospital environment. Therefore,
requiring submission to a blood test following a lawful
arrest is not a violation of the ... right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Interest of I.R.L, 739 P.2d at 1125.
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DEFENDANT'S MIRANDA RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED.
Whether and how Miranda applies to a DUI arrest is a settled
question in Utah.

In Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah

1979), the court stated that in a DUI the only obligation an
officer has regarding Miranda is to tell a DUI suspect that
Miranda does not apply to the decision to take a chemical test.
This duty does not even arise unless a DUI suspect asks about
Miranda or manifests some confusion about Miranda7s
applicability.
When the driver manifests to the officer that he does
not understand his duty under the implied consent law
in light of the Miranda warning, the officer has a
responsibility to clarify the driver's rights and
responsibilities. ... [I]t is incumbent on the
arresting officer to explain unequivocally ... that the
rights explained in a Miranda warning to remain silent
and to consult an attorney do not apply to the decision
to take a chemical test.
While an arrested motorist has the right to refuse to
give statements to a police officer, ... he does not
have the right to refuse to take a blood test.
Id.
In the instant case there is no record evidence showing
Defendant ever asked about Miranda.

Officer Newren,

consequently, had no duty to explain to Defendant the
inapplicability of Miranda.
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT VIOLATED,
As to Defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment, in Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979), the
court cited with approval the following language:
In other words, we hold that the taking of the
defendant's blood under the implied consent law was not
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a critical stage of the criminal proceeding requiring
the assistance of counsel to preserve the defendant's
basic right to a fair trial. The Trial Court [properly
admitted defendant's blood test].
Id. at 354; see also, Utah Code 41-6-44.10(7) (no right to counsel
before BAC test administered).
EVEN IF DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT, DEFENDANTS BAC
TEST WAS ADMISSIBLEUnder Schmerber v. California, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966), a
warrantless seizure of a DUI suspect's blood can be
constitutional.

In People v. Ford, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 189 (Cal.

App. 1992), the court summarized Schmerber7s application:
The courts of this state have frequently summarized
Schmerber as permitting warrantless compulsory seizure
of blood for the purpose of a blood alcohol test if the
procedure (1) is done in a reasonable, medically
approved manner, (2) is incident to a lawful arrest,
and (3) is based upon reasonable belief the arrestee is
intoxicated. ... [E]vidence obtained in violation of
state statute is not inadmissible unless the statutory
violation also has a constitutional dimension.
Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
Ford indicates that compulsory seizure, rather than
consensual seizure, is authorized, so long as no constitutional
violation occurs.

This is true even in an "unaggravated" case

like Ford where there was no injury or accident.

Id. at 192.

While implied consent laws often serve to obviate the need
for compulsory seizure of blood for BAC testing, a non-consensual
seizure of a DUI defendant's blood for BAC testing can withstand
constitutional scrutiny.

One of the policy reasons underlying

this rule is that the evanescent nature of alcohol creates an
exigent circumstance, allowing for a warrantless search or
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seizure, so long as all the facts and circumstances show the
officer acted reasonably.

This court discussed this concept in

City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994) .7
In the instant case, Officer Newren's actions were
objectively reasonable.

In addition to the facts the City

discussed above regarding consent, other factors show Officer
Newren acted reasonably:

at the time of the draw, about one (1)

hour and forty-five (45) minutes had passed since the accident,
thus the two-hour presumptive time limit for admissibility was
approaching; the encounter between Officer Newren was not
combative, rather, it was cooperative; and, as the City has
argued above, taken as a whole, the blood draw was performed in a
reasonable manner.
Therefore, even if this court finds no consent occurred,
Defendant's BAC test was still properly admitted because the
exigent circumstance of dissipating evidence existed and because
the manner in which that evidence was gathered was objectively
reasonable.

7

In the trial court, the City did not make this argument.
However, one exception to the general rule against arguing a issue
for the first time on appeal "is that we may affirm trial court
decisions on any proper ground, even though the trial court
assigned another reason for its ruling." State v. Elder, 815 P.2d
1341, 1344, note 4 (Utah App. 1991).
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the City respectfully requests this court to
affirm the trial court's ruling denying Defendant's suppression
motion.
DATED and submitted this April 18, 1995.

Edward A. Berkovich

MAILING CERTIFICATE
On April 18, 1995, I mailed two (2) copies of this
Respondent's Brief to:
LARRY LONG
Defendant's Attorney
225 North State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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ADDENDA

Orem Dept. - 4th Circuit Court
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF OREM CITY
VS
SOLOMON, CHRISTOPHER
663 E 485 S
OREM
UT

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

84058

CASE NO:
DOB:
TAPE:
DATE:
CITATION:

945000780
02/09/57
94195 COUNT:
04/29/94
,

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
Charge: 41-6-44 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS
Plea: Not Guilty
Find: Guilty - Bench
Fine:
1000.00
Susp:
0.00
Jail: 180 DA
Susp:
0
ACS:
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS:
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85%
Credit:
0.00 Paid:
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS:
Credit:
0.00 Paid:

0.00

Due:

0.00

Due:

0.00

Due:

1

STATUTES

state agencies having use for the records for accident
prevention purposes. However, the department may
disclose the identity of a person involved in an accident when the identity is not otherwise known or
when the person denies his presence at the accident.
The department shall disclose whether any person or
vehicle involved in an accident reported under this
section was covered by a vehicle insurance policy, and
the name of the insurer.
(2) Written reports forwarded under this section
may not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or
criminal, arising out of an accident, except that the
department shall furnish upon demand of any party
to the trial or upon demand of any court a certificate
showing that a specified accident report has or has
not been made to the department in compliance with
law, and if the report has been made, the date, time,
and location of the accident, the names and addresses
of the drivers, the owners of the vehicles involved,
and the investigating officers. The reports may be
used as evidence when necessary to prosecute charges
filed in connection with a violation of Subsection (3).
(3) A person who gives information in oral or
written reports as required in this chapter knowing
or having reason to believe that the information is
false is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987)

41-6-41.

Statistical information r e g a r d i n g accid e n t s — Annual publication.
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all
accident reports and shall publish annually, or at
more frequent intervals, related statistical information as to the number and circumstances of traffic
accidents.
(as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987)

41-6-42. Local p o w e r s to r e q u i r e r e p o r t
A local authority may by ordinance require that
the operator of a vehicle involved in any accident, or
the owner of the vehicle, also file with the designated
municipal department a written report of the accident or a copy of any report required under this article to be filed with the department on accidents occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the
confidential use of the municipal department and are
subject to Section 41-6-40.
(as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987)

ARTICLE 5
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND
RECKLESS DRIVING
41-6-43.

Local DUI a n d related o r d i n a n c e s a n d
reckless driving o r d i n a n c e s — Consist e n t with code.
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that
governs a person's operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having alcohol in
the blood or while under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug, or t h a t governs, in relation to any of those
matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests,
_or_ evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that
governs any combination of those matters, shall be
consistent with the provisions in this code which govern those matters.
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that
governs reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of
this code which govern those matters.
(as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987)

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol,
drugs, or with specified or unsafe
blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol —
Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant— P e n a l t i e s — S u s p e n s i o n
or revocation of license — P e n a l t i e s .
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the
person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown by a
chemical test given within two hours after
the alleged operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree that renders the
person incapable of safely operating a vehicle,
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled
to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against
any charge of violating this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person
has also inflicted bodily injury upon another
as a proximate result of having operated the
vehicle in a negligent manner.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence
is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or
similar circumstances.
(c) In this section, a reference to this section
includes any similar local ordinance adopted in
compliance with Section 41-6-43.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor
more than 240 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail,
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than 24 hours nor
more than 50 hours.
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, the court shall order the person to participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(ii) For a violation committed after July
1, 1993, the court may order the person to
obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility determines that the person
has a problem condition involving alcohol or
drugs.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation
committed within six years of a prior violation under
this section the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240
consecutive hours nor more than 720 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail,
require the person to work in a community-ser-
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vice work program for not less than 80 hours nor
more than 240 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, the court shall order
the person to participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility.
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two prior violations under this
section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and (7); and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the
prior convictions are for violations committed after April 23, 1990.
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall
as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160
hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to
jail, require the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than
240 nor more than 720 hours.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or
community-service work program, the court
shall order the person to obtain treatment at
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, as appropriate.
(c) (i) Under Subsection (a)(ii) the court shall
as part of any sentence impose a fine of not less
than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than
2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to
jail, require the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than
240 nor more than 720 hours, but only if the
court enters in writing on the record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve
the jail sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court
may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the program
provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow
through after the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or
community-service work program, the court
shall order the person to obtain treatment at
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility.
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six years of the prior violations under this section is a third degree felony if at
least three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 23, 1990.
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence
impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720
hours nor more than 2,160 hours.
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to
jail, require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than 240 nor
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters
in writing on the record the reason it finds the
defendant should not serve the jail sentence.
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
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program approved by the court may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and longterm closely supervised follow through after
the treatment,
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, the court shall order
the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may not be suspended and
the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until any sentence imposed under this section
has been served. Probation or parole resulting from a
conviction for a violation under this section may not
be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the
department that:
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education, treatment, and
rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after July 1, 1993, have been completed;
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for
restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed
against the pers.i have been paid, if the conviction is a second or subsequent conviction
for a violation committed within six years of
a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any
abusive or illegal manner as certified by a
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the conviction is for a third
or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed after July 1, 1993.
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5),
(6), and (7) that require a sentencing court to order a
convicted person to: participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion
of the court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, mandatorily,
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; or do any combination of those things,
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45
that qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsection
(10).
(ii) The court shall render the same order
regarding education or treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section
41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior conviction
under Subsection (10), as the .court would
render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5),
(6), and (7).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a
conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualified
as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this
subsection, a previous conviction under either
this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a
prior conviction.
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation DrOprrflm anA onv /»Ammnni'fw-V>Qca^ nr
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other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by the Department of
Human Services.
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of
Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under Section 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for,
an original charge of a violation of this section, the
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis
for the plea, including whether or not there had been
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of
the facts that shows whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination
of both, by the defendant, in connection with
the violation.
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant
before accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45 as follows.
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of
violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor
states for the record that there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with
the violation, the resulting conviction is a
prior conviction for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7).
(c) The court shall notify the department of
each conviction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior
offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6),
and (7).
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section when the
officer has probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation
was committed by the person.
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall
suspend for 90 days the operator's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1),
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation.
(b) The department shall subtract from any
suspension or revocation period the number of
days for which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if the previous
suspension was based on the same occurrence
upon which the record of conviction is based.
(as last amended by Chapters 168, 193, and 234, Laws
of Utah 1993)

41-6-44.1,

Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings.
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with
the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter
46b, in its adjudicative proceedings.
(as enacted by Chapter 161, Laws of Utah 1987)

41-6-44.3.

Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence.
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety shall establish standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, including standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the in-
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fluence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited,
documents offered as memoranda or records of acts,
conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was
made and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards established in Subsection (1), are
admissible if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the
regular course of the investigation at or about
the time of the act, condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which
made and the method and circumstances of their
preparation indicate their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption that
the test results are valid and further foundation for
introduction of the evidence is unnecessary.
(as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987)

41-6-44.4.

Person under 21 may not operate vehicle with detectable alcohol in body
— Chemical test procedures — Temporary license — Hearing and decision —
Suspension of license or operating
privilege — Fees — Judicial review.
(1) (a) As used in this section "local substance
abuse authority" has the same meaning as provided
in Section 62A-8-101.
(b) Calculations of blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration under this section shall be
made in accordance with the procedures in Subsection 41-6-44(2).
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of age
may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle with any measurable blood, breath, or urine
alcohol concentration in his body as shown by a chemical test.
(b) (i) A person with a valid operator license
who violates Subsection (a), in addition to any
other applicable penalties arising out of the incident, shall have his operator license denied or
suspended as provided in Subsection (ii).
(ii) (A) For a first offense under Subsection (a), the Driver License Division of the
Department of Public Safety shall deny the
person's operator license if ordered or not
challenged under this section for a period of
90 days beginning on the 30th day after the
date of the arrest under Section 32A-12-209.
(B) For a second or subsequent offense under Subsection (a), within three
years of a prior denial or suspension, the
Driver License Division shall suspend
the person's operator license for a period
of one year beginning on the 30th day
after the date of arrest.
(c) (i) A person who has not been issued an
operator license who violates Subsection (a), in
addition to any other penalties arising out of the
incident, shall be punished as provided in Subsection (ii).
(ii) For one year or until he is 17, whichever is longer, a person may not operate a
vehicle and the Driver License Division may
not issue the person an operator license or
learner's permit.
(3) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable
grounds to believe that a person may be violating or
has violated Subsection (2), the peace officer may, in
connection with arresting the person for a violation of
Section 32A-12-209, request that the person submit

dards established by the Division of Substance Abuse.
(c) At the conclusion of the penalty period imposed under Subsection (2), the local substance
abuse authority shall notify the Driver License
Division of the person's status regarding completion of the recommended action.
(d) The local substance abuse authorities
shall cooperate with the Driver License Division
in:
(i) conducting the assessments;
(ii) making appropriate recommendations for action; and
(Hi) notifying the Driver License Division about the person's status regarding
completion of the recommended action.
(e) (i) The local substance abuse authority is
responsible for
(A) the cost of the assessment of the
person's alcohol abuse; and
(B) for making a referral to an appropriate program on the basis of the
findings of the assessment.
(ii) (A) The person who violated Subsection (2)(a) is responsible for all costs and fees
associated with the recommended program
to which the person is referred.
(B) The costs and fees under Subsection (A) shall be based on a sliding scale
consistent with the local substance
abuse authority's policies and practices
regarding fees for services.
(as last amended by Chapters 83 and 234,
Laws of Utah 1993)

41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results
in actions for driving u n d e r t h e influence — Weight of evidence.
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was
operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with
a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence.
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance
with Section 41-6-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of
a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or
drug content is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical control, the test result is admissible as evidence of the
person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of
the alleged operating or actual physical control, but
the trier of fact shall determine what weight is given
to the result of the test.
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at
the time of the alleged operating or actual physical
control.
(as last amended by Chapter 161, Laws of Utah 1993)

41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified offenses may prosecute for c e r t a i n DUI
offenses and driving while license suspended or revoked.
The following class A misdemeanors may be prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns, as well as by

prosecutors authorized elsewhere in this code to prosecute these alleged violations:
(1) alleged class A misdemeanor violations of
Subsection 41-6-44 (6)(a)(ii); and
(2) alleged violations of Section 53-3-227, which
consist of the person operating a vehicle while his
operator's license is suspended or revoked for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with the requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the person was charged with violating as a
result of a plea bargain after having been originally
charged with violating one or more of those sections
or ordinances.
(as last amended by Chapter 234, Laws of Utah 1993)

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for
alcohol or drug — N u m b e r of tests —
Refusal — Warning, r e p o r t — Hearing,
r e v o c a t i o n of license — Appeal — Pers o n incapable of refusal — Results of
test available — Who may give test —
Evidence.
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this
state is considered to have given his consent to a
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for
the purpose of determining whether he was operating
or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily
prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the
direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe
that person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under
Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol
and any drug under Section 41-6-44.
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of
the tests are administered and how many of them
are administered.
(ii) If an officer requests more than one
test, refusal by a person to take one or more
requested tests, even though he does submit
to any other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section.
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a chemical test or
tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select
the test or tests to be administered.
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific chemical test
is not a defense to taking a test requested by
a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to
the requested test or tests.
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest,
has then been requested by a peace officer to submit
to any one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test
requested, the person shall be warned by the peace
officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to
submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of
the person's license to operate a motor vehicle.
(b) Following the warning under Subsection
(a), if the person does not immediately request
t h a t the chemical test or tests as offered by a
peace officer be administered a peace officer shall
serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver Li-

cense Division, immediate notice of the Driver
License Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice
on behalf of the Driver License Division, he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or
permit, if any, of the operator,
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for
only 29 days; and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver License Division, basic
information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the Driver License Division.
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if
approved as to form by the Driver License Division, serve also as the temporary license.
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after the date of the arrest,
that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been operating or was in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4 or while under
the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination
of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44
and that the person had refused to submit to a
chemical test or tests under Subsection (1).
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the
Driver License Division's intention to revoke his
license under this section is entitled to a hearing.
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be
made in writing within ten days after the
date of the arrest.
(iii) Upon written request, the division
shall grant to the person an opportunity to
be heard within 29 days after the date of
arrest.
(iv) If the person does not make a timely
written request for a hearing before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle
in the state is revoked beginning on the 30th
day after the date of arrest for a period of:
(A) one year unless Subsection (B)
applies; or
(B) 18 months if the person has had
a previous license sanction after July 1,
1993, under this section, Section
41-2-130 or 41-6-44.4, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under Section 41-6-44.
(0 (i) If a hearing is requested by the person
and conducted by the Driver License Division,
the hearing shall be documented and shall cover
the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was
operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44; and
(ii) whether the person refused to submit
to the test,
(g) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent:
(A) may administer oaths and may
issue subpoenas for the attendance of
witnesses and the production of relevant
books and papers; and
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers.
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees
and mileage from the Transportation Fund
in accordance with the rates established in
Section 21-5-4.

(h) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was requested
to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused
to submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails
to appear before the Driver License Division as
required in the notice, the Driver License Division shall revoke his license or permit to operate
a motor vehicle in Utah beginning on the date
the hearing is held for a period of:
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or
(B) 18 months if the person has had
a previous license sanction after July 1,
1993, under this section, Section
41-2-130 or 41-6-44.4, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under Section 41-6-44.
(ii) The Driver License Division shall
also assess against the person, in addition to
any
fee
imposed
under
Subsection
53-3-205(14), a fee under Section 53-3-105,
which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs.
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the revocation was improper.
d) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under
this section may seek judicial review.
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the
district court in the county in which the person resides.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in
any other condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for
in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not.
(4) Upon the request of the person who was
tested, the results of the test or tests shall be made
available to him.
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30,
acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw
blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This
limitation does not apply to taking a urine or breath
specimen.
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical
nurse, or person authorized under Section
26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer,
draws a sample of blood from any person whom a
peace officer has reason to believe is driving in
violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune
from any civil or criminal liability arising from
drawing the sample, if the test is administered
according to standard medical practice.
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own
expense, have a physician of his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests
administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect admissibility of the resuits of the test or tests taken at the direction of a
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests
to be taken at the direction of a peace officer.
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to
the test or tests administered at the direction of a
peace officer.

41-6-44.10 (cont'd)
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to
submit to a chemical test or tests, the person to be
tested does not have the right to consult an attorney
or have an attorney, physician, or other -person
present as a condition for the taking of any test.
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a
chemical .test or tests or any additional test under
this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in
any civil or criminal action br proceeding arising out
of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,
any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug.
(as last amended by Chapters I6L. 193, 205, and 234, Laws of
Utah 1993)

53-3-223.

Chemical test for driving under the influence — Temporary license — Hearing and decision — Suspension and fee
— Judicial review.
(1) (a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to
believe that a person may be violating or has violated
Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the operation of a vehicle
with a certain blood or breath alcohol concentration
and driving under the influence of any drug, alcohol,
or combination of a drug and alcohol, the peace officer
may, in connection with arresting the person, request
that the person submit to a chemical test or tests to
be administered in compliance with the standards under Section 41-6-44.10.

(b) In this section, a reference to Section
41-6-44 includes any similar local ordinance
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43
(1).
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to
the person's submission to a chemical test that a test
result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 shall,
and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient
to render the person incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of
the person's license to drive a motor vehicle.
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and
the test results indicate a blood or breath alcohol content in violation of Section 41-6-44, or if the officer
makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds,
that the person is otherwise in violation of Section
41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the
test or making the determination shall serve on the
person, on behalf of the division, immediate notice of
the division's intention to suspend the person's license to drive a motor vehicle.
(4) (a) When the officer serves immediate notice
on behalf of the division he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or
permit, if any, of the driver,
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate
effective for only 29 days; and
(iii) supply to the driver, on a form to be
approved by the division, basic information
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing
before the division,
(b) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the division, serve also as
the temporary license certificate.
(5) The peace officer serving the notice shall send
to the division within five days after the date of arrest and service of the notice:
(a) the person's license certificate;
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense;
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the
division indicating the chemical test results, if
any; and
(d) any other basis for the officer's determination that the person has violated Section 41-6-44.

(6) (a) Upon written request, the division shall
grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within
29 days after the d a t e of arrest. The request to be
heard shall be made within ten days of the date of the
arrest.
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the division in the county in which the arrest occurred,
unless the division and the person agree that the
hearing may be held in some other county.
(c) The hearing shall be documented and
shall cover the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section
41-6-44;
(ii) whether the person refused to submit
to the test; and
(iii) the test results, if any.
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent:
(A) may administer oaths and may
issue subpoenas for the attendance of
witnesses and the production of relevant
books and papers;
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers.

(ii) The division shall pay witness fees
and .mileage from the Transportation Fund
in accordance with the rates established in
Section 2-15-4.
(e) One or more members of the division may
conduct the hearing.
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before
any number of the members of the division is as
valid as if made after a hearing before the full
membership of the division.
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order
whether the person's license to drive a motor vehicle is suspended or not.
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held
fails to appear before the division as required in
the notice, the division shall order whether the
person's license to drive a motor vehicle is suspended or not.
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not
challenged under this subsection, is for a period of 90
days, beginning on the 30th day after the date of the
arrest.
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under
this subsection is for a period of one year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest.
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person,
in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection
53-3-205(14) for driving under the influence, a fee
under Section 53-3-105 to cover administrative costs,
which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated. This fee shall be cancelled if the
person obtains an unappealed division hearing or
court decision that the suspension was not proper.
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under this subsection may
file a petition within 30 days after the suspension
for a hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed by Section 53-3-224.
(as renumbered and amended by Chapters 205 and 234,
Laws of Utah 1993)
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EXHIBIT 2

RECEIVED

STATE OF UTAH
Michael O. Leavkt
Governor

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

FEP ? ?. 199*
City or Orem

DIVISION OF LABORATORY SERVICES
PUBLIC SAFETY TOXICOLOGY SECTION
46 North Medical Drive • Salt Lake City, Utah 84113 • (801)584-8400 • FAX-584-8486 L-6Q3.1
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TOXICOLOGY REPORT
Agency

OREM POLICE OEPT.

Suspect(s)

S0L0MAN, CHRISTOPHER

Officer

SCOTT NEWREN

Laboratory No

L94-0263

Your Agency Case No

LABORATORY FINDINGS:

Blood Alcohol:

0.15 percent (w/v) ethanol.

Analyzed by Bruce Beck
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Final Report
Amended Report
Supplemental Report
Additional Results to Follow

day of

February

19 94

BLANK DUI REPORT FORM

DUI REPORT FORM
CASE IDENTIFICATION:
Date
Day
Accident
Case #
Time Prepared
Subject's Name
Address
Place of Employment
Address
Home Telephone Number
Work Telephone Number
DOB
Driver License Number
Time of Arrest
Place of Arrest
Charges
Arresting Officer
Arresting Agency
Assisting Officers
VEHICLE
Year
Color
License # and State
Registered Owner

Make

WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically)
Name
Address

Model
Disposition
Address

Telephone Number

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL:
The facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle are:

DRIVING PATTERN:
Subject's location when first observed
The facts observed regarding driving pattern:

PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT:

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Odor of alcoholic beverage
Speech
Balance
Signs or complaints of injury or illness
Other physical characteristics

Aqe/DOB

2.
3.
4.
5.
Were tests demonstrated by officer?

Subject's ability to follow instructions

SEARCHES
A.
Vehicle:
Was subject's vehicle searched?
When?
Evidence

Where?

Person who performed the search
CHEMICAL TESTS:
Mr. or Ms.

, do you understand that you are under arrest for

Q

Driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs or with a measurable amount of a controlled
substance or metabolite in your body? (41-6-44, 41-6-44.6 UCA)

Q

An alcohol offense under 21 years of age in violation of 32A-12-209 UCA'?

Response (if any)
I hereby request that you submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) content of your
blood/breath I request-that you take a
test.
(blood - breath- urine)
Q

The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was administered:

Test results indicating an unlawful amount of alcohol or a controlled substance or its metabolite in your
breath/blood/urtne in violation of Utah Law, or the presence of alcohol and/or drugs sufficient to render you
incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in denial, suspension, or disqualification of your driving
privilege or refusal to issue you a license.
What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test9 Response
Did subject submit tg a chemical test9
Test Administered by
Time
Results
Serial No. of test instrument

Type of test
Where 9
Was subject notified of results9

(if the subject refuses the test, read the following)
The following admonition was given by me to the subject.
If you refuse the test or fail to follow my instructions, the test will not be given However. I must warn you
that your driving privilege may be revoked for one year for a first refusal or 18 months for a subsequent
refusal after July 1. 1993, with no provision for limited driving After you have taken the test, you will be
permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer a test at your own expense, in addition to the
one I have requested, so long as it does not delay the test or tests requested by me I will make the test
results available to you. if you take the test
Unless you immediately request a test, the test cannot be given

Response, if any

.

(if the subject claims the right to remain silent or the right to counsel read tne Tonowingj
The following admonition was given by me to the subject
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which is civil in
nature and separate from the cnminal charges Your right to remain silent does not give you the right to
refuse to take the test You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure Unless you
submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test I warn you that if
you refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited
license
INTERVIEW
Was subject advised of the following rights9
When 9
By Whom
Where9
1 You have the right to remain silent
2 Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law
3 You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being
questioned If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before
any questioning, if you wish one
4 If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answering
questions at any time Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning
Were the following waiver questions asked 9
1 Do you understand each of these right I have explained to you 9
Response
2

Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now9
Response
___

Were you operating vehicle9
Where were you going 9
What street or highway were you on 9 _
Direction of travel9
Where did you start from 9
When9
What time is it now9
9
What is today s date
(Actual time
Date
What city or county are you in now 9
What were you doing during the last three hours9

Day of week9

Have you been drinking9
What9
How much9
9
Where
When did you have your first drink9
Are you under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now9
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills medicines or drugs of any kind 9
(What kind9 Get sample)
When did you have the last dose 9
Are you ill 9
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions )
Were you involved in an accident today9
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident9
If so what9
When 9
9
How much

Day of Week9

Last drink9

)

XIII.

ATTACHED DOCUMENTS:
I have attached the following documents to this report:
1. O

Copy of citation/temporary license

2. !Z] Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit
3. !Zl Traffic accident report
4. LJ Other documents (specify)

I hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer, Special Function Officer or Port-of-Entry Agent and
that the information contained above in this report form and attached documents is true and correct to my
knowledge and belief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my duties It is my
belief the subject was in violation of Section 41-6-44 41-6-44 4, 41-6-44 6, 32A-12-209, or 53-3-418 UCA
at the time, and place specified in this report

Signature of Officer or Agent
Agency
Date

The original of this form and the Driver License copy of the Citation must be
sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to

DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION
PO BOX 30560
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84130-0560

Time

